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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHER KHAN, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
PERRY ZOLEZZI, INC., a corpora-
tion, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
7346 
Brief of Appellant 
This is an appeal by Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corpora-
tion, from two judgments entered December 30, 1948, on 
both counts of plaintiff's complaint as amended, and 
from the order of the trial court denying a motion for 
new trial of said defendant. The action was commenced 
against Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, and W. R. 
Perry. The defendant Perry was never served with sum-
mons, did not appear in said action except as a witness 
for plaintiff, and no judgment was taken against defend-
ant W. R. Perry, the entire proceeding being against de-
fendant Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation, appellant 
herein. 
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PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff's original (R. 1-3) complaint alleged that 
on June 1, 1946, defendant W. R. Perry made, executed 
and delivered to plaintiff his promissory note in the sum 
of $18,588.83, payable on or about six months after date 
at Eugene, Oregon, with interest at five per cent per 
annum from date, with reasonable attorneys fees in case 
suit· or action be instituted to collect the note. A copy 
of the note was set forth in the complaint. It was further 
alleged that on or about July 1, 1946, defendant corpora-
tion, for valuable consideration, promised to pay the 
amount of said note to plaintiff, and that defendant cor-
poration received property in the amount of the note from 
defendant W. R. Perry upon an undertaking to apply it 
pursuant to such promise, and to pay it to plaintiff. That 
the defendant corporation thereby assumed and agreed 
to pay the said note to plaintiff. That pursuant to such 
promise the defendant corporation on September 21, 
1946, did pay to plaintiff the sum of $3,588.83 to apply 
upon said note and reduced the balance of the note to the 
principal sum of $15,000. Plaintiff had demanded from 
defendants, and each of them, said sum of $15,000, plus 
interest, but that it had not been paid, and that the whole 
thereof is past due and .owing, and that a reasonable sum 
to be adjudged as attorneys fees is the sum of $1,500.00. 
To this complaint defendant corporation inter-
posed general and special demurrers, which were over-
ruled. (R. 15, 16, 26). 
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Defendant corporation thereupon filed its ans,ver, 
alleging that it had no information sufficient to enable it 
to ans,Yer the allegations as to the execution of said 
promissory note by defendant ,V. R. Perry, and therefore 
denied the same, admitted that defendant W. R. Perry, 
without authority of defendant corporation, caused the 
sum of $3,588.83 of the funds of defendant corporation 
to be paid to plaintiff upon an obligation of said W. R. 
Perry to plaintiff, and denied the remaining allegations 
of said complaint. Defendant further answered and alleg-
ed that the purported obligation attempted to be set forth 
and alleged in plaintiff's complaint is barred by the pro-
visions of Section 33-5-4, U.C.A. 1943. (Statute o[ 
Frauds). (R. 27, 28) 
Plaintiff thereupon, by leave of court, filed an amend-
ment to his complaint by adding a second cause of action, 
wherein as a second cause of action plaintiff alleged that 
I 
on or about July 1, 1946, defendant Perry sold, trans-
ferred and delivered all of the assets and business of said 
W. R. Perry to defendant corporation for cash and 
credits in the sum of $142,809.90, for the transfer to de-
fendant Perry of $50,000 of the capital stock of defendant 
corporation, which cash, credits and capital stock were 
paid by defendant corporation. That the defendant cor-
poration became a purchaser of stock of goods, wares and 
merchandise in bulk from the said W. R. Perry otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular 
and usual prosecution of seller's business, and that it 
did not demand from the seller at least five days pre-
viously thereto, and receive from the seller a statement. 
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as provided for in Section 33-2-1, U.C.A. 1943, and 
did not notify at least five days previously thereto 
every creditor as shown by such verified statement 
of the proposed sale or transfer, and the time 
and condition of payment, and did not cause the purchase 
money for sucli property to be applied ratably to the 
payment of bona fide claims of creditors of said W. R. 
Perry. That by the provisions of Section 33-2-2, 
U.C.A. 1943, said sale to the defendant corporation was 
fraudulent and void. That defendant corporation assumed 
control over the assets of said W. R. Perry and sold and 
disposed of said assets without paying to the creditors 
their proportionate share of the full purchase price. That 
said plantiff considered the said sale as being fraudu-
lent and void and has attached the property of the de-
fendant corporation. That a.t the time of said sale and 
transfer the said W. R. Perry was indebted to plaintiff 
as alleged in the first cause of action, and that the only 
payment thereafter was the payment by defendant cor-
poration to plaintiff of the sum of $3,588.83, leaving a 
balance of $15,000, together with interest, which said 
sum, together with interest, was not the proportionate 
share of the purchase price to which plaintiff was en-
titled since the debts of defendant Perry, including the 
debt to plaintiff, amounted to the sum of $142,809.90, 
and the defendant W. R. Perry transferred assets to de-
fendant corporation having an agreed and reasonable 
value upon the date of transfer of $192,809.90. That the 
assets transferred to defendant corporation by W. R. 
Perry have now been sold and disposed of by defendant 
corporation for a value in excess of the debts of W. R. 
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Perry, and that the proceeds realized therefrom are suffi-
eient to satisfy the debt o'ving to plaintiff. That plain-
tiff has made demand upon defendants, but the same 
has not been paid, and that a reasonable attorneys fee is 
the sum of $1500.00. 
To plaintiff's complaint as amended defendant cor-
poration interposed a g·eneral and special demurrer to 
___ each alleged cause of action separately, and also to the 
complaint as a 'vhole, upon the ground that several causes 
of action are improperly united in said complaint as 
amended (R. 55-56). 
Defendant corporation also interposed a motion to 
dismiss the second eause of action and for an order strik-
ing and expunging from said complaint as amended the 
alleged second ·cause of action, and the whole thereof, or 
in the ·alternative requiring and ordering plaintiff to 
elecct between said alleged causes of action, as to which 
of the same he will stand upon as the basis for 
his remedy in said proceeding, upon the ground that the 
alleged causes of action and remedies sought are in-
consistent in that the alleged first cause of action and 
remedies sought are inconsistent in that the alleged first 
cause of action by its terms seeks to enforce and secure 
the benefit for plaintiff of a purported contract, whereas 
under the alleged second cause of action plaintiff 
attempts to and seeks to repudiate, disavow and declare 
null and void as to plaintiff the said transaction as re-
ferred to in the first cause of action (R. 57). 
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Demurrer of defendant corporation was by the trial 
court overruled and defendant's motion was denied by the 
trial court on December 17, 1947 (R. 59). 
Defendant corporation thereupon filed its answer to 
plaintiff's second cause of action, wherein it admitted 
upon information and belief that defendant W. R. Perry 
was, prior to the 29th day of July, 1946, indebted to plain-
tiff upon a certain promissory note approximately as set 
forth in plaintiff's first cause of action, and that said 
W. R. Perry thereafter paid to plaintiff the sum of 
$3,588.83 from the funds of defendant corporation to 
apply thereon. Defendant corporation further admitted 
upon information and belief that W. R. Perry had not 
paid the balance· of said obligation. Defendant corpora-
tion further admitted that the assets transferred to de-
fendant corporation by defendant W. R. Perry had now 
been sold and disposed of by defendant corporation. The 
remaining allegations of plaintiff's second cause of ac-
tion were denied. 
As a first separate defense to plaintiff's second 
cause of action defendant corporation alleged that prior 
to the 29th day of July 1946, defendant W. R. Perry was 
indebted to certain secured and unsecured creditors in 
the sum of approximately $164,000.00, including the 
obligation to plaintiff; that Perry was the owner of cer-
tain real property valued at approximately $135,000.00, 
subject to a mortgage in the sum of approximately $36,-
500.00, and certain supplies and accounts receivable 
valued at approximately the sum of $30,000.00; that 
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defendant corporation agreed "rith defendant W. R. 
Perry that it "\VOuld lend to said vV. R. Perry the sum of 
$50,000.00 and cause a mortg·a.ge in the sum of $80,000.00 
to be placed upon the real property of defendant Perry 
and assume and agree to pay said mortg·age and accept 
ronveyanc.e of said real and personal property from W. R. 
Perry as full payment for $50,000 of the common capital -
stock of defendant corporation, and issue to defendant 
W. R. Perry, or his order, 50,000 shares of its common 
capital stock; that it "-ras a part of said agreement that 
said defendant W. R. Perry would, from said funds so to 
be made available to him by defendant and from the per-
sonal funds of said \V. R. l=>erry, pay and discharge or 
cause to be paid and discharged by payment or com-
promise, or otherwise, all of said debts and obligations 
.... of said defendant W. R. Perry; that it 'vas further a part 
of said agreement that said Perry was to pay and dis-
eharge all of said obligations of every name, nature, and 
deseription, and that i~ the event said Perry were to 
transfer to defendant corporation any property or assets 
in excess of the amount necessary to fully pay and dis-
charge his subscription to capital stock in the sum of 
$50,000, that the said defendant \V. R. Perry should be 
given credit upon the books and records of ~efendant 
corporation for the amount of such excess, not to exceed 
$10,000; that in compliance with said agreement said 
Perry transferred and conveyed said assets to defendant 
corporation, and said defendant corporation did and per-
formed all things to be by it done and performed under 
its agreement with Perry, and that defendant corpora-
tion verily believed that there were no obligations of said 
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Perry outstanding and unpaid when it received from 
defendant Perry a conveyance of said as-sets, and that 
there was therefore no requirement on its part to comply 
with the provisions of Section 33-2-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. Defendant corporation further alleged as a 
part of said first separate defense that plaintiff 'vas, 
prior to the consummation of said agreement between 
defendant and Perry, or immediately thereafter, fully 
informed of said agreement between defendant and 
Perry and knew of the fact that defendant was to 
receive said assets free and clear of any demand 
or claims of creditors of said Perry, and of the fact 
that defendant was to commence its corporate existence 
without debts or obligations, save and excepting the 
secured obligation in the sum of $80,000, and knew and 
understood that defendant would, pursuant to the terms 
of said agreement, cause shares of its capital stock to be 
issued to said Perry and would permit additional shares 
to the amount of $50,000 to be subscribed for and fully 
paid by individuals other than said Perry upon the basis 
of such understanding and agreement with defendant 
Perry, and that notwithstanding such knowledge and in-
formation plaintiff failed to protest the same or to take 
other action to void said assignment and conveyance, but, 
on the contrary, consented thereto ; tha.t the plaintiff 
agreed with said Perry that plaintiff would look to Perry 
for payment of his said obligation from personal funds 
of Perry and would regard said obligation as a personal 
indebtedness of Perry; that defendant corporation ac-
cepted said conveyance and assignment of assets and 
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issued to Perry 50,000 shares of the capital stock of 
defendant corporation and accepted subscriptions for 
and payment of its capital stock from other persons, 
firms, and individuals in the sum of $50,000 in the belief 
that Perry had fully paid and discharged, by payment, 
compromise, or otherwise, all of the debts and obligations 
of Perry; that by reason of said belief defendant corpora-
tion transacted business and incurred obligations in its 
own name from the date of its incorporation to the date 
of commencement of this action in the belief that the 
corporate defendant was obligated for only obligations 
created by itself. That by reason thereof plaintiff was 
guilty of laches in attempting at this time to question the 
validity of said sale and assignment by Perry to defend-
ant corporation, and that plaintiff is estopped to question 
the validity thereof at this time. 
Defendant further alleged as a part of said defense 
that plaintiff had accepted and received payment of the 
sum of $3,588.83 from the funds of defendant ·corporation 
on account of said obligation of said Perry to plaintiff 
and as a credit upon said promissory note of said Perry. 
It was further alleged as a part of said first separ-
ate defense that plaintiff has attached and levied upon 
the moneys and funds of defendant corporation as its 
funds, proceeds from the sale of a portion of said assets 
so transferred and conveyed to defendant corporation by 
Perry, and that plaintiff has thereby ratified and ap-
proved said sale and is estopped to deny or seek to void 
said sale by Perry to defendant corporation, or to seek 
to set aside said sale as frauaulent or void. 
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It was further alleged as a part of said further de-
fense that plaintiff wholly failed to take prompt action. to 
question the validity of said sale or to void the same, 
notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff knew of same and 
knew of the fact that defendant corporation would issue 
50,000 shares of its capital stock, fully paid, to Perry on 
the basis of said sale, and knew that defendant corpora-
tion would sell and dispose of its capital stock to others 
upon the belief that all of the debts and obligations of 
Perry were paid and discharged, and that defendant cor-
poration had received said assets in the belief that said 
assets were free and clear from all claims and demands 
of creditors of Perry, including plaintiff, and that by 
reason of all of the matters and things set forth in said 
first separate answer plaintiff is estopped at this time to 
seek to avoid said sale and conveyance by Perry to de-
fendant corporation, and that plaintiff is guilty of such 
laches as to deny to him the right to seek the aid of 
equity in said premises. 
As a second further answer to plaintiff's second 
cause of action defendant corporation alleged that plain-
tiff, by filing its first cause of action herein, and by 
attaching the funds of defendant corporation, elected to 
treat said conveyance and transfer of property from 
Perry to defendant corporation as a. valid conveyance and 
sale, and has elected his remedy herein ( R. 60-66). 
To this answer of defendant corporation plaintiff 
interposed a general and special demurrer to each 
separate defense (R. 70-73). 
10 
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Under date of March 25, 1948 the trial court sus-
tained plaintiff's general demurrer to the first separate 
defense of defendant (R. 76). 
Plaintiff thereupon filed his motion to strike from 
the answer of defendant to the plaintiff's second cause 
of action the second separate defense of defendant, upon 
the ground that the second separate defense does not 
state a defense to plan tiff's second cause of action. That 
the court has heretofore ruled that plaintiff could bring 
its suit upon both causes of action, the first alleging an 
assumption of liability by defendant, and the second 
alleging implied assumption of liability under Chapter 2, 
Title 33, U.C.A. 1943 (R. ·77). 
Under date of April 14, 1948 the trial court made 
and entered its order granting plaintiff's motion to strike 
the second defense of defendant (R. 83). 
Thereafter, on April 20, 1948, the action of the trial 
court in striking the second affirmative defense to the 
second cause of action was rescinded, and the court sus-
tained plaintiff's demurrer to the second separate de-
fense to the second cause of action without leave to 
amend (R. 84). 
11 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
2. That on or about the lOth day of July, 1946, the 
defendant, W. R. Perry, for a valuable consideration, 
made, executed and delivered to the plaintiff his certain 
promissory note in words and figures as follows, to-wit: 
(Note set forth) 
3. That on or about July 17, 1946, a promotion 
agreement was executed by W. R. Perry and Stephen 
Zolezzi for and on behalf of the defendant corporation. 
That the said W. R. Perry and Stephen Zolezzi suhscribed 
for all of the capital stock of the defendant corporation, 
excepting one thousand (1000) of the one hundred thou-
sand (100,000) shares of capital stock subscribed. That 
tlie one thousand (1000) shares that were not subscribed 
for by these two incorporators were subscribed for five 
hundred (500) shares for Leonard Elton and five hund-
red shares for L. W. Wrixon, both acting as the attorneys 
for the incorporators and for the corporation. That the 
other party to the said agreement was W. R. Perry. That 
by the terms of the said agreement, which is set out in 
Exhibit B, the promoters undertook, on behalf of the 
defendant corporation, to purchase said assets from 
W. R. Perry and as consideration for the said assets to 
assume and pay the debts owing by W. R. Perry and in-
cluding the debt owed by W. R. Perry for the note here-
inabove referred to, which was then held by this plain-
tiff, and to give to W. R., Perry Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000.00) in capital stock in Perry Zolezzi, Inc., the 
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corporate defendant. That by the said agreement the cor-
porate defendant assumed and agreed to pay the said 
note to the plaintiff. That on or about July 27, 1946 and 
on or about August 1, 1946, the defendant corporation 
receiYed property consisting of cash and real and per-
sonal property to the agreed value of One Hundred 
Ninety Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars and 
Ninety Cents ($194,809.90) from W. R. Perry, and as part 
of the consideration therefor promised to pay this note 
to the plaintiff, and received the said property upon the 
undertaking pursuant to such promise to apply the prop-
erty received to the payment to this plaintiff of said note 
and other debts of W. R. Perry, amounting in all to the 
sum of One Hundred Forty-T,vo Thousand Eight Hund-
red Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($142,809.90). That 
pursuant to such promise the corporate defendant, on 
or about August 1, 1946, made entries upon its own books 
to record the fact that it assumed this note of Eighteen 
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and 
Eighty-Three Cents ($18,588.83) owing to the plaintiff, 
and that it agreed to pay the amount of this indebtedness 
to the plaintiff. That the defendant corporation thereby 
assumed and agreed to pay the said note to the plaintiff. 
4. That pursuant to said promise the defendant 
corporation, on September 21, 1946, did pay to the plain-
tiff the sum of .Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-
Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83), to 
apply upon the said note and reduced the balance of said 
note to the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars 
{$15,000.00). That the payment so made was made by 
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the defendant corporation, acting through its President 
and General Manager, W. R. Perry. That during all of 
the times in question, W. R. Perry was the President and 
General Manager of the defendant corporation and 
authorized to transact all of the business of the defendant 
corporation. 
5. That although the plaintiff has made demands 
upon the defendants, and each of them, for the said sum 
of Fifteen Thousand dollars, plus interest as provided 
in the said note, neither of the defendants have paid the 
said amount, and the whole thereof is past due and owing. 
6. That a reasonable sum to be adjudged as attor-
ney's fees for the attorneys for the plaintiff, in accord-
ance with the terms of the note herein sued upon, is the 
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact on the First 
Cause of Action, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
That the plaintiff is hereby entitled to a judgment 
against the defendant corporation for Fifteen Thousand 
Dollars ($15,000.00), plus interest at the rate of five per 
cent per annum, as is provided in said note, from the date 
of delivery to December 27, 1948, in the amount of Eigh-
teen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty One Cents 
($1,881.41), or the sum of Sixteen Thousand Eight Hund-
red Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents {$16,881.-
41), plus attorney's fees in the amount of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00), together with plaintiff's costs herein 
incurred. 
14 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Adopts Findings of Fact numbers 1 and 2 a.s set 
out in the first cause of action. 
2. That between the 27th day of July, 1946 and 
August 10, 1946, ,V. R. Perry sold, transferred and de-
livered all of the assets and business of the said W. R. 
Perry to the defendant corporation for c.ash and credits of 
One Hundred Forty~T"TO Thousand Eight Hundred 
Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($142,809.90) and for the 
transfer toW. R. Perry of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50, 
000.00) of the capital stock of the defendant corporation, 
which cash, credits and capital stock were paid by the 
defendant corporation, except the sum of Fifteen Thou-
sand Dollars ($15,000.00) due to the plaintiff from W. R. 
Perry; that the defendant corporation became a pur-
chaser of the stock of goods, wares and merchandise in 
bulk from the said W. R. Perry otherwise than in the 
ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual 
prosecution of the seller's business; that the defendant 
corporation has pleaded in the first affirmative defense 
set out in its answer that it believes that there was no 
requirement on its part to comply with the provisions of 
Section 33-2-2 U.C.A. 1943, known as the Bulk Sales Act, 
and therefore it did not comply with the provisions of the 
State statute. That the defendant corporation, the pur-
chaser as herein stated, did not demand from the seller, 
at least five days previously thereto, and receive from 
the seller a statement as provided in Section 33-2-1, 
U.C.A. 1943, and did not notify at least five days pre .. 
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viously thereto, every creditor, as shown by such verified 
statement, of the proposed sale or transfer and the time 
and conditions of payment, and did not cause the pur-
chase money for such property to be applied ratably to 
the payment of the bona fide claims of all creditors of 
the said W. R. Perry. That by the provisions of Section 
33-2-2, U. C. A. 1943, the said sale to the defendant cor-
poration was fraudulent and void. That nevertheless, 
the defendant corporation assumed control over the as-
sets of the said W. R. Perry and sold and disposed of the 
said assets without paying to the creditors of W. R. 
Perry their proportionate share of the full purchase 
price, except as hereinafter stated. That the plaintiff 
has considered the said sale as being fraudulent and 
void as to the plaintiff and has attached the property of 
the defendant corporation, a part of which property were 
the assets transferred by W. R. Perry to the defendant 
corporation. 
3. That at the time of the said sale and transfer, 
W. R. Perry was indebted to the plaintiff on a promis-
sory note in the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred 
Eighty-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($18,588. 
83), being the note set out in paragraph two of the 
Findings on the First Cause of Action; that the only pay-
ment thereafter made by W. R. Perry, or by the defend-
ant corporation to the plaintiff was the payment made by 
the defendant corporation to the plaintiff of the sum of 
Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars 
and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83) on September 21, 
1946, to apply upon the obligations of the said note Ieav-
' 
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ing a. balance o\ving9 from the said W. R. Perry and the 
defendant corporation in the sum of Fifteen Thousand 
Dollars ( $15,000.00), tog-ether "rith interest as provided 
in the said note. That the said sum of Three Thousand 
Five Hundred Eig-hty-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three 
Cents ($3,588.83) was not the proportionate share of the 
purchase price to which this plaintiff was entitled, since 
the debts of the defendant Perry, including the debt to 
Plaintiff, amounted to the sum of One Hundred Forty-
Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars and Ninety 
Cents ($142,809.90), and W. R. Perry transferred assets 
to the defendant corporation having an agreed and rea-
sonable value upon the date of the transfer of One Hund-
red Ninety-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Nine Dollars 
and Ninety Cents ($192,809.90); that the defendant cor-
poration paid in full a.ll of the other creditors of W. R. 
Perry, but paid to the plaintiff only the sum of Three 
Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and 
Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83). That the books of the 
defendant corporation contain the fact that it did make 
this payment of Three Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-
Eight Dollars and Eighty-Three Cents ($3,588.83) to the 
plaintiff. That none of the officers or directors of the 
defendant corporation objected to the making of the said 
payment to the plaintiff; that the payment so made was 
made by the defendant corporation acting through its 
President and General Manager, W. R. Perry; that dur-
ing all the times in question W. R. Perry was the Presi-
dent and General Manager of the defendant corporation 
and authorized to transact all of the business of the 
defendant corporation. 
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4. That upon the transfer of these assets by W. R. 
Perry to the defendant corporation, the defendant cor-
poration made entries upon its books and records that 
it became indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of Eigh-
teen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars and 
EightyThree Cents ( $18,588.83). That the officers and 
directors of the defendant corporation made no objection 
to the entries so made upon the books of the defendant 
corporation, showing this indebtedness by the defendant 
corporation to the plaintiff. 
5. That the assets transferred to the defendant 
corporation by W. R. Perry have now been sold and dis-
posed of by the defendant corporation, and it received an 
amount in excess of the debts of the defendant W. R. 
Perry, which existed at the time of the transfer, and tha~ 
the proceeds realized therefrom are sufficient to satisfy 
, the debts owing to the plaintiff. 
6. That although the plaintiff has made demands 
upon the defendants, and each of them, for the payment 
of said sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), 
plus interest as provided in the said note, neither of the 
said defendants have paid the· said amount, and the whole 
thereof is past due and owing. 
7. That a reasonable sum to be adjudged as attor-
ney's fees to be allowed for the enforcement of the pay-
ment of this note, as is provided in said note, is the sum 
of Two Thousand ($2,000.00) Dollars. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now 
makes and enters the following: 
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1. That the plaintiff is hereby a\varded judgment 
against Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a corporation of the State of 
Utah, for the sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000), 
plus interest at the rate of five per cent per annum, as is 
provided in the said note, from the date of delivery to 
December 27, 1948, in the amount of Eighteen Hundred 
Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($1,881.41), or 
the sum of Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-One 
Dollars and Forty-One Cents ( $16,881.41), plus attor-· 
ney's fees in the amount of Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00), and plaintiff's eosts herein expended. 
2. That the sale and transfer of the assets from 
W. R. Perry to the defendant Perry Zolezzi, Inc., a cor-
poration, be held fraudulent and void as to this plaintiff. 
3. That the value of the assets transferred by W. R. 
Perry to the defendant corporation being in excess of the 
amount of the debts owing by W. R. Perry and the value 
of the assets being more than sufficient to pay each of 
the creditors of W. R. Perry the full amount of their 
claims against W. R. Perry, including the claim of this 
plaintiff, with interest and attorney's fees added, the 
defendant corporation shall pay the amount of this judg.:. 
ment to the plaintiff. 
4. That the judgment herein rendered on the First 
and Second Causes of Action are not cumulative, but the 
satisfaction of one judgment will satisfy and discharge 
the other. 
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JUDGMENT 
On plaintiff's First Cause of Action plaintiff is 
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant corpora-
tion for Fifteen Thousand Dollars ( $15,000.00), plus 
interest thereon at the rate of five per cent per annum 
from date of delivery to December 27, 1948, iri the amount 
of Eighteen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One 
Cents ($1,881.41), amounting to Sixteen Thousand Eight 
Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One cents ($16,~ 
881.41), together with attorney's fees in the amount of 
Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00), and plaintiff is also 
awarded his costs expended herein. 
On plaintiff's Second Cause of Action plaintiff is 
hereby awarded judgment against the defendant corpora-
tion for Fifteen Thousand Dollars ( $15,000.00), together 
with interest at the rate of five per cent per annum from ' ' , , 
date of delivery to December 27, 1948, amounting to 
Eighteen Hundred Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One 
Cents ($1881.41), making Sixteen Thousand Eight Hund-
red Eighty-One Dollars and Forty-One Cents ($16,881.-
41), together with attorneys fees in the amount of Two 
Thousand Dollars ( $2000.00), and plaintiff shall also 
have his costs herein expended. 
That the sale and transfer of the assets from W. R. 
Perry to the defendant corporation is hereby declared to 
be fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff. 
That the value of the assets transferred by W. R. 
Perry to the defendant corporation, being in excess of 
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the amount of the debts owing by W. R. Perry and the 
value of the assets being more than sufficient to pay 
each of the creditors of W. R. Perry the full amount of 
their claims against ,V. R. Perry, including the claim of 
this plaintiff, 'vith interest and attorney's fees added, 
the defendant corporation is hereby required to pay the 
amount of said judgment to the plaintiff herein. 
That the judgment rendered herein on Plaintiff's 
First and Second Causes of action are not cumulative, 
and the satisfaction of one judgment will satisfy and dis-
charge the other. (R. 96-103, 105-106). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant corporation was organized in July, 1946. 
Its capital of $100,000 was paid in by $50,000 cash paid 
in by Stephen Zolezzi and $50,000 cash and property paid 
in by W. R. Perry who had been a member of a partner-
ship known as Neilson and Perry, then owned by Perry, 
which owed debts and obligations in the sum of $164,000, 
of which $36,500 was a mortgage on certain real property 
which had an agreed value of $135,000. The remaining 
obligations were unsecured, among which was a note of 
plaintiff in the sum of $23,588.83. A fund of $168,000 to 
pay all liabilities of Neilson & Perry and Perry was pro-
vided as follows: 
$80,000 by a new mortgage on the real estate 
$50,000 cash to Perry to be loaned by the corporation 
$10,000 cash from Perry 
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$18,000 turkey drafts owned by Perry 
$10,000 accounts receivable owned by Perry and to 
be converted into cash 
Perry was to pay his $50,000 subscription to the 
capital stock of defendant corporation by paying in the 
$4,000 residue of the above fund after payment of all 
debts and obligations and by transferring to the corpor-
ation the equity in the real estate, $55,000, plus $30,000 
(the agreed value of certain supplies and prepayments 
in the sum of $15,000, together with additional accounts 
receivable and assets in the sum of $15,000), making a 
I 
total of $89,000, from which was to be deducted $40,000 
of the $50,000 loaned by the corporation to Perry. The 
remaining $10,000 of the $50,000 loaned by the corpora-
tion to Perry for his use in paying all debts of Neilson & 
Perry and Perry was to be repaid by Perry to the cor-
poration and was to be a corporate asset, thus paying 
Perry's subscription in full. 
Perry was to be President and General Manager of 
the defendant corporation and was to engage in the 
business of buying, processing and selling turkeys. 
The fund for payment of all liabilities of Neilson & 
Perry and Perry was to be deposited in First National 
Bank to be disbursed upon written direction of Perry, 
but only after receipt of a certificate of title insurance 
showing title to the land, buildings and equipment free 
of liens and incumbrances in the defendant corporation, 
subject only to the new mortgage in the sum of $80,000 
and current taxes. 
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This proposed transaction was represented by a pre-
organization agreement between Perry and Zolezzi (Ex-
hibit "B"). 
One of the provisions of that agreement was as fol-
lows: 
''(It is understood that the liability due Sher 
Khan, in the amount of $23,588.83, may be settled 
temporarily by the payment of, say, $5,000.00 in 
cash and the execution by Mr. Perry of a note 
for the balance or $18,588.83. In such event, the 
cash remaining in the hands of the First National 
Bank of Salt Lake City, to be transferred by Mr. 
Perry to the new corporation will be increased by 
$18,588.83 and will be subject to the obligation in-
curred by Mr. Perry in the same amount of 
$18,588.83.) '' 
This preorganization agreement was dated July 17, 
1946. Prior thereto Perry had paid $5,000 on plaintiff's 
obligation and had executed the note in question in this 
case, signed by himself, dated June 1, 1946, but not de-
livered to plaintiff until July 11, 1946 (R. 131). 
The articles of incorporation of defendant corpora-
tion were dated July 16, 1946 and filed July 22, 1946. 
On July 27, 1946 Perry conveyed the real property to 
defendant corporation, and on the same date a mortgage 
on the property was executed by defendant corporation 
for $80,000 to the bank, and the sum was deposited to the 
credit of the corporation on August 6, 1946. (R. 201) 
On July 27, 1946 Perry also transferred other assets, 
stock in trade, merchandise, fixtures, furniture and a.c-
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counts receivable to the corporation pursuant to the 
provisions of Exhibit '' B' '. 
Moneys were withdrawn for the payment of creditors 
of Neilson & Perry and Perry through Mr. Wilson of the 
Bank and a Mr. Duke, an employee of Neilson & Perry 
and Perry; later secretary of defendant corporation (R. 
138, 201). 
The corporation held a meeting of the Board of 
Directors at San Francisco, California, on July 29, 1946, 
at which the corporation accepted the conveyances from 
Perry of the real and personal property for the sum of 
$89,000, giving him credit for $40,000 on his $50,000 note 
and issuing him 49,000 shares of stock. It was also pro-
vided in the minutes (Exhibit I) that in the event the 
fair value of the assets ultimately contributed by Perry 
should be less than the value specified ($4000 cash and 
$30,000 miscellaneous assets) that t~e $40,000 credit on 
the note should be reduced, or in the event it was more 
that the credit on the note should be increased. 
The corporation, however, did not commence doing 
business until September 3, 1946 (R. 135). In the mean-
time Perry did business in the name of W. R. Perry, 
Turkeys, using the corporate facilities and property. 
The company books were opened on September 3, 
194~, and the opening entries were made hy Mr. Duke 
and Wells, Baxter & Miller, Mr. Perry's accountants, as 
directed by Mr. Perry ( R. 159, 160). In setting up the 
corporate books they listed as an account payable by the 
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corporation the .oblig·ation to plaintiff in the sum of 
$18,388.83 and g·aye Perry credit for $21,564.11 for 
"receipt of assets and assumption of liabilities of W. R. 
Perry.'' 
On February 21, 194"/ Perry paid $3588.83 to plain-
tiff by company check and the same was entered on the 
corporate books. 
In :Jiarch 1947, Perry ceased to be President, Man-
ager and stockholder of the defendant corporation and 
severed his connection with the company. 
Plaintiff seeks to hold the corporation liable upon 
the promissory note upon three theories : 
1. That on or about July 1, 1946, it for valuable 
consideration, promised to pay the note and assumed and 
agreed to pay the same. 
2. That on the same date it received from Perry 
certain property in the amount of the note upon an 
undertaking to apply the same, pursuant to such promise, 
to pay it to plaintiff. 
(This was the first cause of action.) 
3. That in the sale from Perry to defendant cor-
poration in July 1946, there was no compliance with the 
Bulk Sales Law and that the corporation has disposed :of 
the property received from Perry and hence the sale was 
fraudulent and void as to plaintiff and therefore the 
corporation is liable on the note to plaintiff. 
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(This was the second cause of action pleaded by 
plaintiff by way of amendment to his complaint.) 
Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff on both 
causes of action. 
Such additional facts as may be pertinent will be dis-
cussed and referred to in connection with the respective 
assignments of error. 
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR 
1. The trial court erred in overruling defendant's 
general and special demurrer to plaintiff's complaint as 
amended (R. 55, 56, 59), and in denying defendant's 
motion to strike the second cause of action (R. 57, 59), 
and in denying defendant's motions to require plain-
tiff to elect between the two repugnant and self destruc-
tive causes of action (R. 57, 59, 90, 127, 128, 178, 179). 
2. The trial court erred in sustaining, without leave 
to amend, plantiff's demurrer to defendant's second 
affirmative defense alleging an election of remedies by 
Plaintiff which barred plaintiff's second cause of action 
(R. 65-66, 70-73, 84). 
3. The trial court erred in sustaining plaintiff's 
general demurrer to defendant's first affirmative de-
fense to the second cause of action (R. 62-65, 70-73, 76, 84). 
4. The trial court erred in admitting immaterial 
and incompetent evidence with reference to plaintiff's 
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first cause of action (R. 49, 128; 91, 129); and in failing 
to grant defendant's motion to strike the same (R. 198, 
199) ; and in finding the following facts as to the first 
cause of action: That by the terms of a certain promotion 
agreement, Exhibit "B '', the promoters undertook on 
behalf of defendant to hav-e defendant assume and pay 
the note of plaintiff; that by the terms and prov:isions of 
said Exhibit "B" defendant assumed and agreed to pay 
the note of plaintiff (R. 97, 98); that on or about July 27, 
1946 and August 1, 1946, defendant, as part of the con-
sideration for receipt of certain property from W. R. 
Perry, promised to pay the note of plaintiff and received 
said property upon an undertaking- to apply the property 
to the payment of said note (R. 98); tl1at pursuant to said 
promise defendant made entries upon its own books 
and records of the fact that it assumed the note and 
that it agreed to pay the debt to plaintiff, and that de-
fendant thereby assumed and agreed to pay plaintiff 
(R. 98); that pursuant to said promise defendant on 
September 21, 1946 did pay plaintiff $3,588.83 on the note 
(R. 98); that Perry as president and general manager of 
defendant ".,.as authorized to transact all business of de-
fendant, including the making of said payment (R. 98, 
102); and in concluding as a matter of law that plain-
tiff was entitled to judgment on the first cause of action 
(R. 99); and in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant thereon (R. 105-106)). 
5. The trial court erred in finding as a fact that 
there was no compliance by defendant with the Bulk 
Sales Law in the particulars enumerated (R. 100, 101) 
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and that the sale by Perry to defendant was fraudulent 
and void. (R. 100, 101) a.nd that plaintiff considered the 
same fraudulent and void (R. 100, 101), and that plaintiff 
did not receive his proportionate share of the property 
subject to . the Bulk Sales Law which was conveyed by 
Perry to defendant (R. 100, 101); and in concluding as a 
matter of law that the sale was fraudulent, void and in-
valid as to all property conveyed (R. 103); and in making 
and entering its judgment and decree on the second cause 
of action that said sale of all of said property was fraudu-
lent, void and invalid as to plaintiff, and that defendant 
was liable to plaintiff for the amount of the note (R. 105, 
106). 
6. The trial court erred in making and entering 
inconsistent, repugnant and self-destructive findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgments on the two 
separate counts (R. 97-106). 
ARGUJ\tlENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAI.J COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANT'S GENERAL AND SPECIAL DE-
MURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS 
AMENDED AND IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO ELECT 
BETWEEN TWO REPUGNANT AND SELF-
DESTRUCTIVE CAUSES OF ACTION. 
Plaintiff's original complaint was drawn upon an 
alleged cause of action involving two theories, viz., that 
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defendant corporation had assumed and agreed to pay 
the note of Perry to plaintiff and that as a part of said 
transaction Perry had delivered to defendant corporation 
certain property which defendant corporation undertook 
to apply to the payment of said note. 
These allegations of the complaint were denied and 
defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds. 
Thereafter, by ex parte leave of court, plaintiff 
filed an amendment to his complaint, adding a second 
cause of action, alleging that the sale of assets by Perry 
to defendant corporation "\\ras void and fraudulent be-
cause of failure to comply with the Bulk Sales Law. 
Defendant promptly moved to strike this amend-. 
ment or to require plaintiff to elect as to which cause 
he would stand on for recovery. This motion was denied 
by the trial court. ( R. 70-73, 59) 
It is axiomatic that plaintiff may not by amend-
ment plead an additional or different cause of action, 
and this court has clearly stated the proposition in Com-
bined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, et al, 71 Utah 535, 267 
Pac. 1020 as follows : 
'' * * * It, of course, is familiar doctrine that 
where allegations of a declaration are repug-
nant to and inconsistent with each other, they 
thereby neutralize each other and render the 
declaration bad on general demurrerl; that a 
cause of action alleged in an amended petition, 
though founded in the same grievance or injury 
as that described in the original, is a. different 
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cause of action if it is dependent upon different 
grounds for h~lding the defendant responsible 
for the wrong alleged; and that the power of a 
court to permit an amendment of a pleading does 
not authorize an importation which in effect intro-
duces a new or different cause of action. Hancock 
v. Luke, 46 Utah 26,148 P. 452; Johnson v. Ameri-
canS. & R. Co., 80 Neb. 255, 116 N. W. 517; Kirton 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 57 Fla. 79, 87, 49 So. 
1024; Herlihy v. Little, 200 Mass. 284, 86 N. E. 
294; Altpeter v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 26 Cal. 
App. 705,148 P. 241; Blair v. Brailey (C.C.A.) 
221 F. 7." 
Plaintiff contended that the second cause of action 
was but a second count upon the same cause of action, 
and upon this theory the ruling and subsequent rulings 
of the trial court with reference to the same subject were 
based. Therein the court was in error. 
Not only is the second cause of action an additional 
and different cause of action, but it is in fact repugnant 
to, destructive of, and incompatible with the first, just 
as the first is repugnant to and destructive of the second. 
The two could not stand together under oath as the sworn 
claim of plaintiff as his cause of action. 
We are entirely familiar with the rule which permits 
a plaintiff to set forth his cause of action in several 
counts, upon any one of which he may or may not recover. 
They may be based upon different theories and need not 
be entirely consistent but they cannot be repugnant or 
self-destructive. A plaintiff may not in one allegation 
s.tate that there was a contract between the parties and 
in the next allegation, whether in the same or a separate 
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pleading, allege that there was no contract. He may ·not 
allege validity of a transaction for one purpose and 
allege invalidity of the same transaction for a different 
purpose. They are repugnant and self-destructive and, 
as this court has said, it is the same as no allegation at all. 
How could the conveyance of assets by Perry to the 
Corporation be a valid consideration for the assumption 
of a debt of a third person as alleged in the first cause 
of action if such conveyance was void and of no effect as 
alleged in the second cause of action, and vice versa~ 
This proposition was raised by defendant by special 
demurrer, by motion to strike, by motion_ to require plain-
tiff to elect at the commencement of the trial, by similar 
motion at the conclusion of the evidence, and by motion 
for new trial. 
The trial court persisted in the error, even to the 
extent of making inconsistent and repugnant findings of 
fact and of entering a separate judgment on each of these 
self-destructive causes of action, as will be hereafter 
presented in this argument. 
The court should have granted the motion to strike 
the second cause of action or sustained the demurrer or 
required plaintiff to elect. 
That these two causes of action are repugnant and 
self-destructive is self-evident. One cause is based on an 
express contract, alleged to be valid, for assumption 
of a debt by a third person in consideration of a convey-
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ance of property to the third person. The second cause 
of action alleges that the same contract alleged in the 
first cause of action was fraudulent, null and void. 
This error may be raised by special demurrer where 
it appears on the face of the pleadings and by motions 
requiring an election on the part of the pleader. Defend-
ant pursued both remedies. 
1 American Juris. 469 : 
''Sec. 83. Consistency of Several Causes of 
Action. 
''By necessary implication, causes of action 
which may be joined must have the element of 
consistency to the extent that a choice of one does 
not create a waiver of the opportunity to turn to 
the other. Causes of action which are in their 
nature incongruous or inconsistent cannot be 
united in the same p.etition, even though they 
arise out of the same transaction or out of trans-
actions connected with the same subject of action. 
Causes of action are inconsistent with each other 
when they cannot stand together; when, if one is 
true, the other cannot be; or when one defeats the 
other. Thus, causes of action for breach of con-
tract to convey property and for breach of war-
ranty of authority to sell cannot be joined. Nor 
can one, in the same action, treat a contract as 
rescinded and at the same time rely upon the con-
tract as existing.'' 
41 American Juris. 534 : 
''Sec. 537. Generally-While, ordinarily, the 
proper method of raising a question of mis-
joinder of causes of action, when that objection 
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is apparent upon the face of the pleading, is by a 
demurrer specially assigning the misjoinder as a 
ground of objection, in a number of jurisdictions 
objections to the improper blending of several 
c.a.uses of action, or the misjoinder of causes of 
action, may be raised by a motion to compel the 
plaintiff to elect upon which cause of action he 
will proceed. And where the plaintiff pleads two 
inconsistent causes of action, he will be compelled' 
to elect. But where a. complaint contains 
two or more counts, and each sets forth a 
separate and distinct cause of action, the plaintiff 
will not be required to elect on which count he 
will proceed, provided there is no misjoinder of -
causes of action; neither will election be enforced 
where, otherwise, the causes are not improperly 
blended. Thus, where, under the practice in a 
particular jurisdiction, the plaintiff may declare 
and recover upon any one or more of several 
causes of action on contract which are not incon-
sistent with each other, he will not be required to 
elect as to which contract he will rely on.'' 
The doctrine announced in the Bastian case has con-
sistently been reaffirmed by this court. 
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 
Utah 414, 135 Pac. (2d) 919, this court said: 
"* * * It is well established, as defendant 
contends, that the power of the court to permit 
an amendment to the pleadings does not extend so 
far as to permit the importation of an entirely new 
and different cause of action. Grover v. Cash, 69 
Utah 194, 253 Pac. 676; Combined Metals, Inc., 
v. Bastian, 71 Utah 535, 267 Pac. 1020; Peterson 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 Pac. (2d) 
627; Newton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 88 Utah 
547, 40 Pae. (2d) 204." 
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This should be specially true where the new cause 
of action is repugnant to and destructive of the first 
cause of action. 
The most recently followed is Powell v. Powell, --------
Utah ________ , 188 Pac. (2d) 736, wherein this court said the 
following: 
"It being impossible to reconcile the repug-
nant and inconsistent allegations of the complaint 
and to determine whether the cause of action 
vested in the administrator or the beneficiaries, 
the general demurrer was properly sustained. It 
is unnecessary to treat the questions raised by the 
special demurrer, as was stated by this court in 
the case of Combined Metals, Inc., et al v. Bastian 
et al., 71 ·Utah 535, 554, '267 Pac. 1020, 1026: '* * * 
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that where 
allegations of a declaration are repugnant to and 
inconsistent with each other, they thereby neu-
tralize each other and render th-e declaration bad 
on general demurrer; * * *.' '' 
See also Walser v. Moran, 42 Nevada 111, 173 P. 
1149. 
See also Lynn v. Knob Hill Improvement Co., 177 
Cal. 56, 169 P. 1009. 
On the matter of requiring an election between counts 
which are repugnant and destructive, see Sections 653 
and 654, 1 Bancroft Code Pleading 942, 943. Where the 
c.auses of action are improperly united an election should 
be required. -
Warfield v. ICrueger, 96 Cal. ·App. 671, 274 Pac. 764. 
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Peppers v. Metzler, 71 Colo. 234, 205 Pac. 945. 
Whitson Y. Pac. Nash Motor Co., 37 Idaho 204, 
215 Pac. 846. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING, 
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, PLAINTIFF'S 
DE~fURRER TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND AF-
FIRMATIVE DEFENSE ALLEGING .AN ELECTION 
OF REMEDIES BY PLAJ.NTIFF WHICH .BARRED 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
To plaintiff's second cause .of action defendant cor-
poration pleaded as a second affirmative defense that 
by filing his first cause of action and by attaching funds 
of defendant corporation on the basis ·of a valid contract 
plaintiff had elected to treat. the sale ·by Perry to the 
corporation as valid, and that he had elected his remedy 
in the case; hence the second cause of action could not 
stand. 
This point was first raised upon defendant's motion 
to strike the second cause of action, which was denied, 
and again ·upon the demurrer of plaintiff to defendant's 
second affirmative defen.se, which was sustained without 
leave to amend (R. 84). · Therein the trial court erred . 
. . By.the f~r~t cause of a~tion plaintiff_alleged a valid 
contra~t,. for consideration, by which it was claimed de-
fendant corporation had assumed and agreed to pay the 
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note of Perry held by plaintiff. By that action plaintiff 
elected his remedy and could not thereafter contend that 
the same sale was void and the consideration for the 
agreement non-existent. Such election having been made, 
plaintiff had to stand thereon. He not only took decisive 
action by commencing the action on the theorY of validity 
of the contract, but also attached funds of defendant. 
Cook v. Covey Ballard Motor Company, 69 Utah 161, 
253 Pac. 196 : 
"It is well settled that one who is induced to 
make a sale or trade by the deceit of a vendee has 
the choice of two remedies upon his discovery of 
the fraud ; he may affirm the contract and sue for 
his damages, or he may rescind it and sue for the 
property he has sold or what he has paid out on 
the contract. The former remedy counts upon the 
affirmance or validity of the transaction, the 
latter repudiates the transaction and counts upon 
it~ invalidity. The two remedies are inconsistent, 
and the ·choice of one rejects the other, because 
the sale clllflhtot be valid OJnd void at the sa;me time. 
Stuart v. Hayden (C.C.A.) 72 F. 402, 5 Page 
Contracts, Sec. 3023. '' 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commisssion, 81 Utah 
213, 17 Pac. (2d) 239: 
'' • * * The law applicable to the election of 
remedies is thus stated in 9 R. C. L., p. 960: 'An 
election of a remedy which has the effect of an 
estoppel in pais or an estoppel by record, in that 
class of cases in which the remedies are really in-
consistent, is generally considered made when an 
action has been commenced on one of such 
remedies. Some courts go so far as to say that in 
such cases the choice of a remedy once made can-
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not be withdrawn or reconsidered though no ad-
vantage lias been gained nor injury done by the 
choice, and no injury would be done by setting the 
choice aside. But the more reasonable rule is that 
the mere bringing of an action which has been dis-
missed before judgment, and in which no element 
. of estoppel is pais has arisen, that is, where no 
advantage has been gained or no detriment has 
been occasioned, is not an election.' 
''To the same effect is the statement of law 
in 20 C. J. 29-32, and cases cited in the footnotes. 
While there is some conflict in the adjudicated 
cases as to the effect of the mere commencement 
of an action, the authorities are quite generally 
agreed that it is the first decisive act of election 
that is binding and that subsequent acts may not 
be said to constitute an election. Thus it is said 
in 20 C. J. · 34, 35: 'The doctrine of election of 
remedies applies to the first decisive act of elec-
tion, and makes it a defense to the prosecution of 
a second inconsistent suit or remedy.' '' 
Robison v. Robison, 57 Utah 215, 203 Pac. 340. 
Howard v. Paulson, 41 Utah 490, 127 Pac. 284: 
"The great weight of authority is to the ef-
fect that, where the duty to elect applies, then the 
bringing of an action based upon one of the 
remedies or rights constitutes an election which 
is irrevocable except in case of mistake of fact 
or some other good and sufficicent legal excuse. · 
Peppers v. Metzler, 71 Colo. 234, 205 Pac. 945: 
'' 'A remedy based on the theory of the af-
firmance of a contract or other transaction is in-
consistent with a remedy arising out of the same 
facts and based on the theory of its disaffirmance 
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or rescission, so that the election of either is an 
abandonment of the other.' '' 
As applied to fraudulent conveyances, 37 C. J. S. 
1136, section 305 states : 
''A creditor cannot obtain relief on the theory 
that his debtor's conveyance was void and of no 
effect and on the theory that the debtor effective-
ly conveyed the property.'' 
The same rule applies with reference to fraudulent 
sales under the Bulk Sales Act. 37 C. J. S. 1328, sec. 478. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAIN-
TIFF'S GENERAL DEMURRER TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO DEFEND-
ANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, ALLEGING 
W A IV E R , ESTOPPEL AND . ELECTION OF 
REMEDY. 
This right. under the Bulk Sales statute is a person-
al one which may be waived by the creditor or may be lost 
by electing some other remedy. If the creditor, for exam-
ple, chooses to waive his rights and treat the sale as valid 
and elects a remedy on the basis of a valid sale, the 
creditor loses his right under the statute and must stand 
or fall as to his rights in the light of his election. H:e 
cannot do both. He may also permit an estoppel to arise. 
37 C. J. S., 1328, Sec. 478, under Fraudulent Con-
veyances. 
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Bulk sales la'v is for the benefit of creditors and they 
may or may not elect to claim the benefit of it. 
Castleman v. Stryker, 109 Ore. 326, 219 Pac. 1081. 
Creditors may W'"aive their rights or estop them-
selves from asserting invalidity. 
Kinney Y. Yoelin Bros., 76 Colo. 136, 230 Pac. 127. 
Coleman Y. Costello, 115 Kan. 463, 223 Pac. 289. 
Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174, 86 Pac. 174. 
Chelsea Sales Corp. v. Jacobs, 193 So. 402. 
Wolfe v. Bellfuir Hat Co., 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 908. 
Torreyson v. Burnbaugh, 105 Mo. App. 435, 79 S.W. 
1002. 
A creditor who consents to or acquiesces In sale 
waives his rights and is estopped, particularly if he 
asserts rights under the sale and attempts to obtain the 
proceeds. 
Palo Sav. Bk. v. Cameron, 184 Iowa 183, 168 N.W. 
769. 
Marshall v. Leon, 267 Ill. App. 242. 
Schramm and Schmieg v. Shope, 200 Ia. 760, 205 
N.W. 350. 
Kinney v. Y oelin Bros., Supra. 
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In last named case creditor attached proceeds in 
hands of buyer. This affirmed the sale. 
Acceptance of a note may be a waiver. 
Starr Piano v. Sherer, 97 Ind. App. 77, 185 N.E. 665. 
Schramm-Schmieg v. Shope, Supra. 
Creditor·with knowledge of sale must act promptly 
or within a reasonable time or lose its rights. 
Lietchfield v. Heinicke, 200 Ia. 958, 205 N.W. 774. 
See also Andrew v. Rivers, 207 Ia. 343, 223 N. ,V. 102. 
Under defendant's first affirmative defense to the 
second cause of action defendant could have established 
that this election, waiver and estoppel were accomplished 
at the time of the original transaction. The trial court 
erred in eliminating a consideration of these defenses to 
the second cause of action by sustaining plaintiff's de-
murrer thereto. (R. 76). 
On this entire proposition, from beginning to end, the 
trial court erred in its rulings with reference to this Bulk 
Sales Law and therein· it deprived defendant of its right · 
to have the real merits of the case heard and tried. Ap-
parently the trial court felt that a sale of property, sub-
ject to the Bulk Sales Law, created a liability on the part 
of the purchaser regardless of anything that the creditor 
might do or not do. 
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Plaintiff and the court were under the impression 
that the Bulk Sales Law is different from other remedies; 
that it cannot be waived; that such a sale cannot be rati-
fied or approved by creditors affected by it; that a 
creditor whose rig~hts are affected, with full knowledg·e 
of the facts and that others 'viii act to their prejudice in 
reliance thereon owes no duty to speak up if he does not 
approve the same; and that in spite of such acceptance 
and waiver he may at any time later, after others have 
acted, and notwithstanding his own conduct, step in and 
repudiate the transaction. We respectfully submit that 
such is not the law. 
Then and there it was the duty of plaintiff to act 
and have his status determined. 
If the corporation was to assume and pay his note 
there was a proper way to have that accomplished by an 
instrument in writing in compliance with the Statute of 
Frauds. 
If the corporation was not to assume and pay his 
note he had the right to take appropriate action for the 
protection of his interest by then and their impounding 
the assets. 
On the other hand he could, with full knowledge 
thereof, accept the transaction as it was and look only to 
the signer of the note for payment and leave his status 
unimpaired as a personal creditor of Perry. 
He could also elect to treat the sale as valid and 
take his chances as to whether he could prove a legal 
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liability on the part of defenda~t under the first cause 
of action. 
All of these proper defenses were comprehended 
within its first affirmative defense and it should have 
been permitted to present its evidence with reference 
thereto. 
Defendant's first affirmative defense came squarely 
within the rule announced by the Supreme Court of 
Oregon in Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac. 1105, which 
case arose under the Bulk Sales Law. The law was not 
complied with, but the creditor knew of the transaction 
and consented thereto and agreed to look to the seller 
rather than enforce his rights under the statute. The 
Supreme Court said as follows: 
·· , '' * * * The purchaser did, however, obtain a 
statement which contained all the information 
required by the statute, although the oath was 
lacking. Even where the statute is strictly com-
plied with a creditor loses his right to void the 
sale if he makes no move to protect his claim. Rice 
was notified, and then in effect consented to the 
sale by saying that he would look wholly to the 
Wests for the payment of his account. Every 
benefit which the statute has designed for the 
creditor was made available to Rice, and yet he 
not only in effect gave his approval to the sale,. 
but he waited for two years before making any 
move to repudiate such approval and void the 
sale, and he has therefore waived his right to 
claim the benefit of the statute. The transaction 
between Hume and the Wests 'vas characterized 
by honesty and fair dealing; nothing was conceal-
ed from Rice, but on the other hand he was inform-
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ed of the truth; there 'Yas no attempt to deceive or 
defraud; and although the statute was not techni-
cally observed nevertheless Rice was informed of 
all that he would haYe kno"\\rn, even though the 
statute had been literally followed. If the· bulk 
sales statute had been strictly complied with, 
nevertheless, his own conduct would have pre-
cluded him from now calling upon that statute 
for aid and by the same token he ought not to be 
heard to say that a failure to take a formal step in 
a technical way will relieve him from what would 
otherwise be a complete "Tai ver on his part.'' 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
IMMATERI.A_L AND INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE 
WITH REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION; AND IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE SAME; 
AND IN FINDING THE FOLLOWING FACTS AS 
TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: THAT BY 
THE TERMS OF A CERTAIN PROMOTION AGREE-
MENT, EXHIBIT "B", THE PROMOTERS UNDER-
TOOK ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT TO HAVE 
DEFENDANT ASSUME AND PAY THE NOTE OF 
PLAINTIFF; THAT BY THE TERMS AND PRO-
VISIONS OF SAID EXHIBIT ''B'' DEFENDANT AS-
SUMED AND AGREED TO PAY THE NOTE OF 
PLAINTIFF; THAT ON OR ABOUT JULY 27, 1946 
AND AUGUST 1, 1946 DEFENDANT, AS PART OF 
THE CONSIDERATION FOR RECEIPT OF CER-
TAIN PROPERTY FROM W. R. PERRY, PROMISED 
TO PAY _THE NOTE OF PLAINTIFF AND RECEIV-
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ED SAID PROPERTY UPON AN UNDERTAKING 
TO APPLY THE PROPERTY TO THE PAYMENT 
. OF SAID NOTE; THAT P.URBUANT' TO SAID 
PROMISE DEFENDANT 1\IADE ENTRIES UPON 
ITS OWN BOOKS TO RECORD THE FACT 
THAT IT ASSUMED THE NOTE AND THAT IT 
AGREED TO PAY THE Al\IOUNT OF SAID IN-
DEBTEDNESS TO PLAINTIFF AND THAT DE-
FENDANT THEREBY ASSUMED AND AGREED 
TO PAY THE NOTE TO PLAINTIFF; THAT PUR-
SUANT T'O SAID PROMISE DEFENDANT ON SEP-
TEMBER 21, 1946 DID PAY TO PLAINTIFF $3,588.83 
ON THE NOTE; THAT PERRY, AS PRESIDENT 
AND GENERAL MANAGER OF DEFENDANT WAS 
AUTHORIZED TO TRANSACT ALL OF THE BUSI-
NESS OF DEFENDANT,· INCL1JDING THE MAIC-
ING OF SAID PAYMENT; AND IN CONCLUDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE 
OF ACTION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT FOR HE UNPAID AMOUNT OF 
THE NOTE, PLUS INTEREST AND ATTORNEYS 
FEES; AND IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT ON 
THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. 
On the first cause of action the trial court found 
that on or about July 17, 1946 by preorganization agree-
ment the promoters of defendant corporation obligated 
it to assume and pay this note, and that on or about July 
27, 1946 and August 1, 1946 defendant corporation, as 
a part of the consideration for the receipt of eertain 
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property from Perry, promised to pay the note in ques-
tion and received said property upon an undertaking 
to apply the same to payment of the note. It further found 
that pursuant to such promise it made entries upon its 
own books of the fact that it assumed the note and that 
it thereby assumed and agreed to pay the note. 
Defendant assails these findings of fact upon the 
following grounds : 
1. Insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the same. 
2. Errors of the court in admitting immaterial and 
incompetent eviaence with reference thereto. 
3. That the evidence, if admissable, was insuffi-
cient to meet the Statute of Frauds. 
4. That the findings, if sufficient and supported by 
competent evidence, are destroyed and rendered nuga-
tory by the findings, conclusions and judgment on the 
second cause of action; hence could not sustain such a 
promise, if made. 
Let us, therefore, first examine the evidence and see 
whether it was sufficient and whether it was properly 
admitted for consideration by the court. 
The statutes involved are as follows : 
33-5-4 U.C.A. 1943: 
''In the following cases every agreement shall 
be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
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memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith. 
• * * ... • 
''2. Every promise to answer for the debt, 
default or miscarriage of another. 
• * * • "'" 
83-5-6 U. C.A. 1943 : 
''A promise to answer for the obligation of 
another in any of the following cases is deemed an 
original obligation of the promisor and need not 
be in writing : 
'' 1. Where the promise is made by one who 
has received property of another upon an under-
taking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by 
one who has received a discharge from an obli-
gation in whole or in part in consideration of such 
promise.'' 
The court found that the transaction complied with 
both statutes. 
Defendant contends that it satisfies neither. 
It will be observed tha.t the basis of both statutes is 
a valid promise or undertaking on the part of the third 
party to pay the debt. of another. In one case it must 
be in writing; in the o.ther it may rest in parole; but in 
both cases it must be a.. certain, definite and enforceable 
contract for valid consideration. 
No party to this transaction testified to any such 
understanding or as to any such promise. Perry appear-
ed and testified for plaintiff but he was silent on this 
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subject. The eYidenre of the promise, if such there was, 
must be gleaned by innuendo or deduction from the fol-
lowing: 
THE PREORG.A.NIZATION AGREEMENT (EX-
HIBIT "B"). 
This agreement bet,y·een Perry and Stephen Zolezzi 
(the principal stockholders of defendant) makes refer-
\ 
ence to the note of plaintiff and provides as follows : 
''(It is understood that the liability due Sher 
Khan in the amount of $23,588.83, may be settled 
temporarily by the payment of, say, $5,000.00 in 
cash and the execution by Mr. Perry of a note for 
the balance or $18,588.83. In such event, the cash 
remaining in the hands of the First National Bank 
of Salt Lake City, to be transferred by Mr. Perry 
to the ne\v corporation will be increased by $18,-
588.83 and will be subject to the obligation incur-
red by 1\fr. Perry in the same amount of 
$18,588.83.) ' ' 
Defendant contends that this agreement was not 
binding on the corporation, should not have been admitted 
in evidence over its objection, did not satisfy either 
statute, and in any event did not contain a promise to 
have the corporation assume and pay the note. The cor-
poration never at any time adopted this agreement of 
the promoters, never received the conveyances pursuant 
thereto, and by its first meeting completely omitted any 
reference to the Sher Khan obligation. (See Ex. I) 
Agreements of promoters are not binding on the cor-
poration unless adopted by them expressly or impliedly 
47 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by receiving property in consideration thereof. This 
corporation did neither. It accepted conveyance on the 
basis of its own independent action after it was organized. 
Tanner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit Co., 43 Utah 14, 
134 Pac. 586. 
Murry v. Monter, 90 Utah 105, 60 Pac. (2d) 960. 
The case does not come within the doctrine announc-
ed in Wall v. Mining & Smelting Co., 20 Utah 474, 59 Pac. 
399, because it never adopted the agreement but instead 
set up its O"\\"'Il status and expressly provided how its 
opening entries should be made. According to its action 
the Sher Khan note was to be paid by Perry from the 
funds provided for him for such purpose. This case 
comes squarely within the doctrine announced in the 
Murry case. Nor did the preorganization agreement, as-
suming, without admitting, that it was admissible, pro-
vide that defendant corporation should assume the lia.-
bitlity. It provided that if Perry gave the corporation 
money equal to the amount of the Sher Khan debt that the 
corporation should take the funds ''subject to'' the claim 
of Sher Kahn. 
The most that can be said for such a provision would 
be that Perry might use company funds to pay the debt. 
This is vastly different from saying that the note be-
comes a company liability. 
Courts have uniformly held that taking property 
"subject to" a debt, does not create an independent 
liability on the part of the grantee. 
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Of course, ""'hat actually oecurred was that Perry 
transacted business on his own account between July 22, 
1946 and September 3, 1946, made paper profits, revalued 
the assets, had the books set up on the basis of the status 
on September 3, 1946, and his auditors and bookkeepers 
make the entries he directed, including an entry in favor 
of Sher Khan as a creditor, and then called it square. Mr. 
Duke, Perry's former employee and later secretary of 
the Company, testified that no such additional money 
was received by the company. It was a paper transaction. 
It did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It was 
never signed by the c.orporation or adopted by it. 
New Jersey Mfrs. Casuality Ins. Co. v. Bersick, 119 
N.J. Law, (N.J.), 194 A. 438. 
32. 
"Where release, whereby corporation was to 
indemnify individual against certain suits, was 
not signed by corporation or by its duly authoriz-
ed agent for that purpose, it was unenforceable as 
against corporation under statute of frauds (2 
Comp. st. 1910, p. 2612, sec. 5).'' 
Taylor v. R. D. Scott & Co., 149 Mich. 525, 113 N.W. 
"Where plaintiff made a written proposition 
to defendant corporation and the trustees of an 
estate to which a majority of the corporate stock 
belonged, to purchase defendant's manufacturing 
plant and some material, and the proposition 
was indorsed ''accepted,'' followed by the signa-
tures of the four trustees as such, who were also 
four of the five directors of the corporation, 
there was not such a contract in writing binding 
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on the defendant corporation as to satisfy the re-
quirements of the statute of frauds.'' 
Asbury v. Hugh L. Bates Lodge No. 686, F. & A.M., 
62 Ohio App. 430, 24 N.E. 2d 638: 
"Written minutes in lodges books, signed by 
secretary, or resolution to accept offer to sell 
realty to the· lodge, do not satisfy the require-
ments of the statute of frauds. Gen. Code, sec. 
8621.'' 
McCaffrey v. Town of Lake, 234 Wis. 251, 290 N.W. 
283. 
''A record of the minutes of a town board 
meeting, signed by a town clerk and showing the 
passage of a motion that town attorney be retain-
ed 'for the ensuing term,' was not a 'memoran-
dum' of contract· employing such attorney nor 
'signed by the party to be charged' so as to satisfy 
the statute of frauds. St. 1937, sec. 241.02.'' 
BOOK ENTRIES: 
When Perry finally ceased his individual operations 
under the name of V-.7. R. Perry, Turkeys, under which he 
was paying his liabilities and at the same time transact-
ing business for his own account, he had his auditors 
and bookkeeper make opening entries for the new cor-
poration, defendant. Instead of doing so in accordance 
with the directions and actions of the board of directors 
at its meeting on July 27, 1946 (Exhibit I) he had them 
give himself credit for additional assets (paper profits) 
accrued in the meantime and had them set up the Sher 
Khan obligation as a company liability (R. 159, 160). 
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This action of Perry 'vas never authorized or ratified by 
the directors of defendant and comes squarely within the 
following cases : 
Aggeller & Musser v. Blood, 75 Utah 120, 272 Pa.c. 
933. 
J a.ckson Y. Bonneville Irr. Co. 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 
107. 
Electrical Products v. El. Camp, Inc., 105 Mont. 386, 
73 Pac. (2d) 199. 
Kelly Y. Galloway, 156 O:r:e. 301, 68 Pac. (2d) 474 
and 66 Pac. (2d) 272. 
Earl v. Roberts Fuel Oil, 147 Ore. 646, 35 Pa.c. (2d) 
238. 
Smith v. Steele Motor Co., 53 Ida. 238, 22 Pac. (2d) 
1070. 
Perry had the auditors on September 3, 1946, set up 
the initial entries for the new corporation. In doing so 
he had an entry made showing an account payable to 
Sher Khan in the sum of $18,588.83. Mr. Duke testif~ed 
that this was done by direction of Perry. 
This did not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
New Jersey Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bersick, 
119 N.J. Law 68, 194 Atl. 438. 
Taylor v. R. D. Scott & Co., 149 Mich. 525, 113 N.W. 
32. 
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Asbury v. Hugh L. Bates·Lodge No. 686 F. & A.M., 
62 Ohio App. 430, 24 N. E. (2d) 638. 
Particularly is that true when the individual making 
the entries or causing them to be made is the individual 
who is being benefitted thereby. Perry was acting for 
himself, in his own interests, casting his liabilities on the 
company. 
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consolidated, 
57 Utah 88, 192 Pac. 664. 
Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277, 
66 Pac. (2d) 238. 
Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 Pac. 906, quot-
ing from 14 (a) C.J ., sec. 1891, p. 122. 
If the corporation was to be bound by any such pro-
cedure it would have required some action by the Board 
of Directors. Perry could not a.ct for the company in a 
matter in which his interests were adverse. 
A manager or president may not saddle his per-
sonal liabilities onto a corporation unless the board of 
directors wills it so. 
No one testified that Sher Khan knew anything about 
these transactions. The record is absolutely silent as to 
any communication to him or from him. He did not 
testify in the case. He had no communication from de-
fendant corporation. 
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He had a payment from corporate funds. This is 
not sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The 
most that can be said for it is that Perry was paying 
company funds that ''Tere "subject to" the liability. 
The defendant objected to all of this evidence. The 
objection should haYe been sustained. (R. 128.) 
There is one more piece of evidence which may be 
considered at this time, to-"\Yit, Exhibit "C ", from in-
dependent auditors addressed to the corporation, refer-
ring to the Sher Khan obligation as having been assumed 
by the corporation. 
This letter was not addressed to plaintiff nor was 
it signed by defendant. It was pure heresay. 
It does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Such a 
writing must be a writing subscribed to by the defendant 
corporation, not a letter to it by someone else. 
Defendant's objection to this evidence should have 
been sustained. 
1Iuch of plaintiff's evidence was directed to an effort. 
to reconcile the opening entries as made by Perry with 
the opening entries which he was authorized to make by 
the· directors. The fact still remained that the directors 
never authorized Perry to assume his own obligations on 
behalf of the corporation, and it would have taken cor-
porate action to create such a liability. 
If Perry had testified, which he did not, that there 
was an agreement that the company should assume this 
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liability, the entries made pursuant to such- agreement 
would have been competent to substantiate the fact that 
the agreement was being carried out, but standing alone 
in direct opposition to the action of the Board as to 
what its opening entries should be, they were without 
authorization, and incompetent. They are not evidence 
of the promise. 
The court found that Perry, as president and man-
ager, had authority to make these entries and payment 
on account. No one testified to any such authority. A 
manager or president has no implied authority to deal 
for his corporation in a matter involving his own affairs, 
which this was. He was causing a corporation to assume 
and pay his note. It would take express action of the 
Board of Directors to bind the corporation in a matter 
of that kind, as we see from the foregoing authorities. 
Nor can Sher Khan say that he was in any way mis-
led. He did not testify that he ever heard of any such 
agreement. In fact, he did not testify at all. Had not 
the court erroneously eliminated such evidence by sus-
taining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's affirmative 
defenses as heretofore presented, the real merits of his 
situation as a creditor would have been developed. He 
knew that Perry, his debtor, was president and manager 
of defendant; hence could not act for the corporation on 
the matter of assuming his debt. As a business man he 
should have had his situation clarified at the time. If 
the corporation was to assume it he should have received 
a commitment from the corporation to that effect; other-
wise he should have taken prompt action to see that the 
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transaction was not consummated until he 'vas satisfied. 
He did neither. His situation called for action on his 
part before others became involved with their money. 
This is a much stronger case of notice of lack of authority 
than was held to be such in Compton v. Jensen, 78 Utah 
55, 1 Pac. (2d) 242, "rhere this court held that the fact 
that the owner of property acted as Notary Public on a 
release of mortgage was notice that he was acting with-
out authority. 
Under both provisions of the statute there must be 
some testimony to the effect that there was an agreement. 
To comply with one provision it must be in writing, 
authorized, and to comply with the other it may be oral, 
but an agreement to assume liability is necessary in 
both cases. The agreement' or undertaking is the founda-
tion of both. 
Mere receipt of property is not sufficient in either 
case. 
But assuming, without admitting, that this evidence 
was sufficient, it was all destroyed and rendered void 
when, as hereinafter presented, the court decreed it to he 
void and of no effect and unenforceable as to plaintiff, in 
the second cause of action. If it was void it was not 
valid and could not have been a valid and binding con-
tract as found by the court to be such on this cause of 
action. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AS A 
FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE BULK SALES LAW AND THAT THE SALE 
BY PERRY TO DEFEND ... L\.NT WAS VOID, AND 
. THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT RECEIVE HIS PRO-
PORTIONATE SHARE OF THE PROPERTY CON-
VEYED WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO THE B'ULK 
SALES LAW; AND IN CONCLUDING AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THE SALE WAS VOID; AND 
I.N ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Now let us take a look at the second cause of action 
· (second count). 
The trial court found as a fact that the defendant 
failed to require compliance with the Bulk Sales Law 
and further found the following detailed facts: That de-
fendant failed to demand the statement from Perry; that 
it failed to notify creditors; that it failed to cause the 
purchase money to be prorated; that plaintiff had no 
notice of the sale; that the sale was fraudulent and void; 
that plaintiff considered the sale fraudulent; and void; 
and that $3,588.83 was not the proportionate share of 
the purchase price to which plaintiff was entitled. 
The issue as to whether defendant did or did not 
compiy with the Bulk Sales. Laws was raised by defend-
ant's second cause of action and by defendant's denial 
in its answer. 
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The subject matter as to \vhether defendant did or 
did not comply with the Bulk Sales La\v was never men-
tioned in the case. There is no reference to it in the pre-
trial conference record or in any of the testimony . 
.. 
Plaintiff contented himself 'vith defendant's allega-
tion in its first affirmative defense that no compliance 
\vith that la\Y "\vas necessary because all creditors were to 
be paid by Perry from the fund provided for his use in 
doing so. 
That affirmative allegation that compliance was not 
necessary did not do away with the defendant's denial of 
plaintiff's allegation. When the trial court sustained 
plaintiff's demurrer to that affirmative defense it ceased 
to exist as an issue and there remained only plaintiff's 
allegation and defendant's denial. 
An allegation that no compliance was necessary is 
certainly not an admission, in the presence of a denial, 
that there was no compliance. 
The court will search in vain for any evidence on 
this subject. 
This cause of action, therefore, must fail for lack 
of evidence to support the findings. 
Let us, however, consider the matter a little further 
as a matter of academic interest and see where it leads 
us. 
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The Bulk Sales Law is as follows: 
''33-2-1. Purchaser Must Demand List of Creditors. 
It shall be the duty of every person who shall 
bargain for or purchase any portion of a stock of 
goods, wares or merchandise in bulk otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of trade and in the 
regular and usual prosecution of the seller's 
business, or an entire stock of merchandise in 
bulk, or any portion of the property, furniture, 
fixtures, equipment or supplies of a hotel, restau-
rant, barber shop or other business, used in carry-
ing on such business, otherwise than in the regular 
course of trade, before paying to the seller any 
part of the purchase price thereof, or delivering 
any promissory note or other evidence of indebt-
edness therefor, to demand of and receive from 
such seller a sworn statement in writing, substan-
tially as hereinafter provided, of the names and 
address of all the creditors of the seller, together 
with the amount of the indebtedness due or ow-
ing by the seller to each of his creditors, and it 
shall be the duty of the seller to furnish such 
statement, which shall be verified by oath to sub-
stantially the following effects : * * * '' 
Plaintiff proceeds upon the theory that by this 
statute all of the assets conveyed by Perry to the cor-
poration were subject to that statute. The trial court 
adopted that theory and only upon that basis could it 
have found that the sum paid to plaintiff ($3588.83) did 
not represent its fair proportion of the assets subject to 
the Bulk Sales Law. Therein the court erred. 
The Bulk Sales Law makes fraudulent and void only 
the sale of such property as is subject to that law. Sales 
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of other property are valid unless a creditor can in-
validate them upon other g-rounds not alleged in this 
rase. It is therefore important to determine what assets 
"~hich 'Yere conveyed are c.overed by the statute. 
Prior to 1923 our statute had been construed by this. 
court as having no applicability to property other than 
a stock of goods, wares and merchandise. 
Swanson v. DeVine, 49 Utah 1; 160 Pac. 872. 
In 1923, after decision of the Swanson case, the legis-
lature amended the statute to include "any portion of 
the furniture, fixtures, equipment or supplies of a hotel, 
restaurant, barber shop or other business, used in carry-
ing on such business. '' 
It is defendant's contention that the Bulk Sales Law 
as thus amended does not apply to the following assets 
of Perry included in the conveyance to defendant: 
Real Estate ----------------------------$135,000.00 
Accounts Receivable ------------ 36,768.7 4 
Prepaid Insurance --------------
Deposit-State Ins. Fund ___ _ 
Meter Deposit 
1,010.82 
100.00 
50.00 
$162,929.56 
It is plaintiff's contention, which was adopted by the 
tria1 court, that the 1923 amendment affects all property 
of every business being sold other than in the ordinary 
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course of business. It is the contention of defendant that 
the purpose of the 1923 ame~dm_ent was to bring within 
the statute the property, furniture, fixtures, equipment 
and supplies of hotels, restaurants, barber shops and 
other businesses of a similar nature where such supplies 
and equipment are used to carry on such business; that 
it was not the purpose of the amendment to bring within 
the statute all property of all sellers. 
Let us take two concrete examples to illustrate the 
point. Utah has become an industrial and distributing 
point for the intermountain country. Would it be con-
tended, for example that every time ZCMI, Cudahy Pack-
ing Coinpany, Geneva Steel, Utah Power & Light, Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph, Western Union, or 
one .of our transportation agencies, sells a piece of its 
real property that it must comply with the Bulk Sales 
Law? Utah is also a great mining· State. Would it be 
contended that every time l{ennecott Copper, A. S. & R., 
or United States Smelting & Refining Company sell~ a 
portion of its mining ground that it must comply with 
the Bulk Sales Law? Of course the legislature never 
intended by the 1923 amendment to accomplish any such 
ridiculous result, and .yet by the interpretation given to 
this statute by the trial court as the law of this State, 
no corporation or individual, large or small, regardless 
of its state of solvency, may sell any portion of its prop-
erty used i.n carrying on. i.ts business without complying 
with the Bulk Sales Law. 
We submit that the 1923 amendment has no such 
effect, and that the only portion of the property of Perry 
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conveyed to the corporation 'vhich was subject to the 
Bulk Sales Law was the stock of goods, 'vares, and mer-
chandise of the agreed value of $15,000.00. It will readily 
be seen that such amount prorated to common creditors in 
the sum of $131,500 left plaintiff in fact overpaid. 
The 1923 amendment should be construed in accord-
ance with the intention ~f the legislature. Bulk Sales 
Laws are in derogation of the constitutional right to 
transfer property and transact business through free 
right of contract, and are strictly construed. The prin-
cipal asset of Perry conveyed to the corporation was the 
real estate, having an agreed value of $135,000.00. It is 
this property which is mainly involved in the interpreta-
tion of the Bulk Sales Law. Courts have uniformly 
held that real estate, accounts receivable, and other in-
tangibles do not come within the provisions of the Bulk 
Sales Laws affecting goods, wares and merchandis_e, 
fixtures, etc. 
115. 
Re Elliott (1942), 48 Fed. Supp. 146. 
Ventrilla v. Tortorice, (La.) 107 So. 390. 
Farrell v. Paulus, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N.W. (2d) 700 
Hall v. Corrine, (Tex.) 230 S. W. 823. 
37 c. J. s. 1337. 
Nelson v. Sherwood, (Ill.) 258 Ill. App. 168. 
Peterson v. Freeburn, 204 Ia. 644, 215 N. W. 746. 
Hood Rubber v. Dickey, 167 Okla. 304, 29 Pac. (2d) 
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Plaintiff, however, contends that because our legis.-
lature by the 1923 amendment included ''or any portion 
of the pr~perty, furniture, fixtures, equipment or sup-
plies of a hotel, restaurant, barber shop or other busi-
ness used in carrying on such business'' that the legis-
lature intended thereby to comprehend all property of 
every business used for the purpose of carrying on such 
business. This amendment has to do with only the prop-
erty, furniture, fixtures, equipment and supplies of a 
hotel, restaurant, barber shop or other business. 
That it was the intention of the Legislature to bring 
within the Bulk Sales Law only fixtures of certain types 
of b"\].siness and not to make the law all-inclusive is clear-
ly manifest from a reading of the title to the 1923 am~nd­
ment, as follows : 
''An act relating to the sale in bulk of mer-
chandise, furniture, fixtures, or equipment of 
stores, hotels, restaurants, barber shops, or any 
place of. business wherein the furniture, fixtures 
or equipment so sold in bulk are used in carrying 
on said business." (Laws of Utah 1923, page 172.) 
Had the Legislature intended to include all property 
of every kind by every business of any kind, it would 
not have so limited its applicability to particular kinds 
of property of particular types of business. 
This type of statute comes clearly within the rule of 
statutory construction adopted by this court in the recent 
case. of Perris vs. Perris, 202 Pac. ( 2d) 731. 
See also Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 
41, 252 Pac. 276, where this court refused to construe 
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general language of the usury law in accordance with 
broad language in violation of the clear intent of the 
Legislature, and in doing so used the following strong 
language: 
''It is true that it is the duty of courts to en-~ 
force the plain intent of the statute when the 
parties entitled to the benefit of the statute ask 
for its protection. Courts do not, however, and 
ought not, so interpret a legislative act that the 
property of one citizen is forfeited and lost to 
another, unless the plain and unequivocal mandate 
of the Legislature admits of no other construc-
tion.'' 
The Legislature did not expressly include real prop-
erty of all business concerns and expressly understood 
that it was including only fixtures and other similar p-rop--
erty of certain limited types of business. 
This rule of statutory construction was also applied 
in State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 Pac. (2d) 955, where 
this court said : 
''By the rules of construction the relative or 
qualifying words are to be applied to the words 
immediately preceding or following, unless the 
legislative intent is indicated that a different ap-
plication be made. 59 C. J. 985. '' 
It is a uniform rule of statutory construction that 
where the words ''or other business'' follow a specific 
enumeration of particular types of business, that the 
statute is construed to mean other businesses of a simi-
lar type to those which are specifically enumerated, which 
defendant is not. That this was the intention of the legis-
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lature is made clearly manifest by the fact that it added 
d " d. after the words ''or other business,'' the wor s use In 
carrying on such business.'' It was the· clear intent of 
the legislature to bring within the purview of the Bulk 
Sales Law furniture, fixtures, and equipment in business 
establishments where the furniture, fixtures, and equip-
ment are the principal assets which are used in the con-
duct of the business. In fact the entire amendment shows 
on its face that it was intended to accomplish exactly 
that result. Also, the words ''or any portion of the 
property'' are expressly limited to that type of business. 
In the case of Mattecheck v. Pugh, 153 Ore. 1, 55 
Pac. {2d) 730, it was attempted to bring apartme.nt house 
equipiD:ent within the Bulk Sales Law, which applied to 
''all of the fixtures or equipment used, or to be used, in 
the sale, display, manufacture, care, or delivery of goods, 
I 
wares, or merchandise,. including movable store or office 
fixture~, wagons,. auto trucks or other vehicles,'' be-
cause the statute expressly stated that it applied when-
~ver th~reby substantially the entire business or trade 
theretofore conducted by the vendor shall be sold or 
conveyed. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that such 
general language "must be deemed to have reference 
to the· kinds of business defined in the other parts of the 
statute; that is, to businesses engaged in the sale, display, 
manufacture, care or delivery of goods, wares and mer-
chandise,'' and refused to extend the statute beyond the 
intention of the legislature. 
The rule of ejusdem generis applies to the 1923 
~mendment, and the statute should be held to apply only 
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to sales of goods, "'"ares and merchandise and to fixtures, 
equipment, furniture, and other property of a similar 
type, of hotels, restaurants, barber shops and other busi-
nesses of a similar type. 
In the case of Kirkley v. Portland Electric Power 
Co., 136 Ore. 421, 298 Pac. 237, the court, in construing 
a statute, said the following: 
''In construing this provision of the statute, 
""e apply the rule of ejusdem generis, in accord-
ance wherewith such terms as 'other,' 'other 
thing,' 'others,' or 'any other,' when preceded by 
a specific enumeration, are commonly given a 
restricted meaning and limited to articles of the 
same nature as those previously described. 25 
R.C.L. 997, sec. 240, note 18; 36 Cyc. 1120, note 45. '' 
In White v. Moore, 46 Ariz. 48, 46 Pac. (2d) 1077, a 
provision of the income tax law was involved and the 
question was as to the classification to which the tax-
payer belonged. The rule of statutory construction was 
announced to the effect that under the rule of ejusdem 
generis whenever the general words ''or any other 
business'' follo'v a particular enumeration of types of 
activities, that those general words are intended to 
mean other kinds similar to those specifically named. 
This, in effect, is "\vhat this court did in the Swanson 
case when it refused to include equipment and small 
incidental articles like rubber heels, shoe laces, etc., 
within the provisions of our original bulk sales law. See 
also Farrell v. Paulos, 309 Mich. 441, 15 N. W. (2d) 700. 
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Where a sale or transfer of property is made, part 
of which is within the statute and part without the 
statute, the statute affects only the validity of the trans-
fHr of that portion of the property which is covered by 
the statute. 37 C.J.S., Sec. 481 (f), under Fraudulent 
Conveyances. 
Texas Hide & Leather Company v. Bonds, et al, 155 
Okla. 3, 8 :Pac. (2d) 20. 
See also 50 Am. Juris. 244, Sec. 249 "Statutes." 
We respectfully submit that the second cause of 
action cannot be sustained for the following reasons: 
1. That there was no evidence .to the effect that 
there was no compliance with the Bulk Sales Law. 
2. That the Bulk Sales Law has no applicability to 
the major portion of the assets conveyed, and that the 
payment which plaintiff received was more than he 
would have been entitled to under.the Bulk Sales Law as 
a common creditor of Perry as applied to the portion of 
the assets subject to the Bulk Sales Law. 
3. That the finding of the trial court that the sale 
was fraudulent and void is repugnant to and destroyed 
by the finding and judgment of the trial court in the first 
cause of action that such sale was valid, and that plain-
tiff, by reason thereof, wa.s entitled to recover on the 
basis of a valid assumption by defendant of plain-
tiff's obligation, as elsewhere in this brief presented. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED.IN MAKING AND 
ENTERING INCONSISTENT, REPUGNANT AND 
SELF-DESTRUCTIVE FINDINGS OF FACT, CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS ON THE 
TWO SEPARATE COUNTS. 
The trial court then did the most remarkable thing 
of all: 
1. It found as a fact that the sale was valid and 
that plaintiff 'vas entitled to the benefit thereof as a 
third party beneficiary, and concluded as a matter of 
law the defendant was by express agreement indebted to 
plaintiff on the note on the first cause of action. 
2. It found as a ·fact that the sale was fraudulent 
and void and concluded as a matter of law that defendant 
was indebted to plaintiff on the same note on the second 
cause of action because the agreement was invalid; that 
the transfer and sale to defendant corporation by Perry 
was fraudulent and void as to plaintiff; that the· value of 
the assets transferred by Per~y was in excess of the 
amount of debts owed by Perry and more than sufficient 
to pay all creditors in full with interest and attorneys 
fees; 
3. Ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff on each 
cause of action ; 
4. Entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on each 
cause of action separately. 
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Defendant respectfully submits that the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgments are inconsistent, 
irreconcilable, repugnant to each other, and self-destruc-
tive. 
Assuming, without admitting, that these two causes 
of action are but separate counts of the same cause of 
action, there is still only one cause of action, calling for 
only one set of facts, and one conclusion of law there-
from, upon the basis of which only one judgment may be 
entered. 
Pike v. Clark, 95 Utah 235, 79 Pac. (2d) 1010. 
In Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. (2d) 
697, 128 Pac. (2d) 357, the court states: 
''These arguments are all predicated upon a 
fundamental fallacy. They assume that there can 
be a piecemeal disposition of the several counts 
of a complaint. They assume, when there is more 
than one count in a complaint, and a demurrer is 
interposed and sustained, and a judgment of dis-
missal entered, that there are as many separate 
judgments a.s there are counts in the complaint. 
That is not the law. There cannot be a separate 
judgment as to one count in a complaint contain-
ing several counts. On the contrary, there can be 
but one judgment in an action no matter how 
many counts the complaint contains. (De Vally 
v. Kendall de Vally 0. Co., Ltd. 220 Cal. 742, 
32 P. 2d 638; Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal. 2d 617, 55 P. 
2d 1174; Potvin v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
130 Cal. App. 510, 20 P. 2d 129. In the DeVally 
ca.se, supra, a demurrer was sustained a.nd a 
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judgment entered dismissing t'vo counts of a 
four count complaint. The court held that the 
judgment "~as premature, and dismissed the ap-
peal from it, and stated ( 220 Cal. at page 7 45, 32 
P. 2d at page 639): 'Although the matter is not 
mentioned by counsel for either side, it appears 
that the court should not have given a judgment 
herein until the final disposition of the entire 
cause. The la"T contemplates but one final judg-
ment in a cause. As stated in the case of Nolan v. 
Smith, 137 Cal. 360, 361, 70 P. 166, quoting from 
Stockton, etc., Works v. Glen's Falls Ins. Co., 98 
Cal. (557) 57'7, 33 P. 633: There can be but one 
final judgment in an action, and that is one which, 
in effect, ends the suit in the court in which it was 
entered, and finally determines the rights of the 
parties in relation to the matter in controversy.' " 
Also, see Lutyen v. Ritchie, 37 Idaho 473, 218 Pac. 
430. 
The facts found by the court to sustain that cause of 
action must be consistent and not repugnant and self-
destructive. 
If the facts found are repugnant to each other they 
are self destructive and amount to no findings of fact, 
and will not sustain either judgment, or both judgments. 
On the first cause of action the court found that there 
was a valid contract or undertaking on the part of de-
fendant to pay this note, and that it received property of 
Perry in consideration of a promise to apply that prop-
erty to plaintiff's liability against Perry. The considera-
tion for that promise on defendant's part, so the court 
found, was the conveyance of these assets. If that was 
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true the transation could not be fraudulent. invalid and 
void. 
By its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judg-
ment on the second cause of action, the transaction which 
was the basis for the first cause of action was held to be 
null and void as to plaintiff. If that was true it could 
not have been valid and binding. 
How can both of these propositions be true1 
This court has had occasion to examine and dis-
cuss the situation wherein material findings are incon-
sistent with each other in the case of Independent Oil 
& Gas Co. v. Shelton, et al, 79 Utah 384, 6 Pac. (2d) 1027. 
Th trial court made a finding that a defendant had know-
ledge of the existence of a certain mortgage and also 
that the same defendant had no knowledge of the cove-
nants contained in the same mortgage. This court, in 
setting aside one of the findings, stated : 
"Having reached the conclusion upon this 
record that, the court below properly found that 
at the time the property was conveyed to the 
Shell Oil Company it had no knowledge of the 
covenants contained in plaintiff's mortgage re-
stricting the use of the property, it must follow 
that any finding inconsistent with the finding 
thus approved must give way to the finding which 
is in accord with the evidence. In a suit of equity, 
where findings are inconsistent with each other, 
and one of such findings is supported by the evi-
dence, the l~tter finding will be set aside~ Sand-
berg v. Victor Gold & Silver Mining Co., 24 Utah 
1, 66 P. 360. The finding that the Shell Oil Com-
pany knew of the existence of plaintiff's mortgage 
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on September 3, 1929, "'hen the deed from Mr. 
and Mrs. Shelton was delivered to the Shell Oil 
Company, is disapproved and set aside.'' 
It will be noted that the foregoing was an equity case. 
In a case at la·w .. the judgment cannot stand. 
In Rand v. Columbian Realty Co., et al, 13 Cal. App. 
444, 110 Pa.c. 322, one count of complaint in an action to 
recover money alleged that defendants obtained the 
money under a scheme to defraud through an agent or 
title-holding branch, and alleged an express promise of 
repayment, and another count was in indebitatus assump-
sit alleging indebtedness to plaintiff for money had and 
received, with an allegation of an express promise to 
repay it, the amount being the same in both counts. The 
court found against plaintiff on the first count, which 
involved a.ll facts upon which an agency might be predi-
cated, and found for plaintiff on the second count, which 
finding could only be supported on the theory that the 
court determined under the evidence that the money was 
received fraudulently, or by means of some agent or re-
presentative. The appellate court, in holding the two 
findings inconsistent, stated: 
''All presumptions are in favor of the correct-
ness of the findings of the trial court and its con-
clusion. The .finding that the money was received 
as alleged in the complaint, and the co~plaint 
alleging a contract of repayment, can only be sup-
ported upon the theory that the court determined 
under the evidence that the money was received 
fraudulently and through misrepresentation, or 
by means of some agent or representative as 
above suggested. This finding, howev~r, which it 
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must be presumed the court based upon the evi-
dence in the record, is entirely inconsistent with 
the other finding in connection with the first cause 
of action which related to the same facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction. These 
two findings are. so at variance that a reversal 
of the judgment is made necessary.'' 
Also in the case of Darrah v. Lang, 119 Cal. App. 
552, 6 Pac. ( 2d) 989, the same court stated: 
''The effect of the finding that the transfer 
was made with intent to defraud the creditors of 
the plaintiff is to render the deed valid and bind-
ing. It required a decree holding that the defendant 
is the owner of the property in fee. By necessary 
implication, it is a determination that the plaintiff 
has no right, title or interest in the land. 
''The court, however, adopted another finding 
to the effect that the defendant holds the title to 
the property in question, in trust, to secure the re-
payment of claims for specified sums of money 
which were found to be due from the plaintiff to 
the grantee. If the defendant merely holds the 
property in trust to secure the payment of these 
claims, the deed becomes a mortgage, and the legal 
title remains in the plaintiff. In that event the 
plaintiff had a right to an adjudication that he is 
the owner of the legal title to the property subject 
to the lien as security for the payment of the de-
fendant's claims. 51 C. J. 267, sec. 255. These 
inconsistent findings may not be harmonized. 
They are in irreconcilable conflict. One of them 
holds that the defendant is the legal owner of the 
property. The other one determine~ that he mere-
ly holds an equitable title therein to secure the 
payment of certain ascertained claims. It is im-
possible to say which finding should control the 
court in rendering the judgment. 
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"v'There material findings are in irreeonc.il-
a ble conflict, it becomes necessary to reverse the 
judgment. 2 Cal Jr. 1030, sec. 612; Boyle v. Boyle, 
97 Cal. App. 703, 276 Pac. 118; Ruling v. Sec-
eombe, 88 Cal. App. 238, 263 Pac. 362. '' 
I{nudson Y. Adams, et al, 137 Cal. App. 261, 30 Pac. 
(2d) 608; Henderson et ux Y. Nixon, 66 Ida. 730, 168 Pac. 
(2d) 594. 
If the contract alleged in the first cause of action 
was binding on defendant, for the use and benefit of 
plaintiff, and plaintiff was claiming and demanding and 
recovering as a third party beneficiary on the basis of 
the first cause of action, it could not have been a fraudulent 
and void transaction as found to be the fact and as de-
creed by the court in the second cause of action. If that 
contract was ever made it occurred during July or Au-
gust 1946, before the note b~came due. It either occurred 
or it did not. If it did occur then plaintiffi's claim was 
taken care of by assumption of liability on the part of 
defendant. 
On the other hand, if that contract was fraudulent 
and void as to plaintiff, and if plaintiff regarded it as 
such, as found by the court in the second cause of action, 
it could not be a valid consideration for a contract for 
the benefit of plaintiff in the first cause of action. 
Plaintiff cannot legally enforce contract for his 
benefit, which he himself repudiates as fraudulent and 
void and which he has the court decree to he void. 
Kinney v. Yoelin Bros., 76 Colo. 136, 230 Pac. 127. 
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Coleman v. Costello, 115 Kan. 463, 223 Pac. 289. 
C. J. S. 1328, Sec. 478 Fraud. Con. 
Wolfe v. Bellfuir Hat Co., 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 908 . 
. The principles announced by this court in the Bas-
tian, Powell and Covey Ballard cases, supra, are equally 
applicable to findings and judgment. 
Let us bear in mind that plaintiff is the one who is 
endeavoring in this proceeding to have the transaction .~ 
declared to be both valid and invalid. He is the one who 
seeks to enforce· the contract in the first cause of action ·j J 
. ~
and invalidate it in the second cause of action. 
These are all specific findings of fact. It is not a 
case of inconsistency between specific and general find-
ings. They are all specific and diametrically opposed to 
each other and self-destructive. This court may not say 
which was right and which was wrong, nor may this , 
court in this case make its own findings of fact. This is · 
a law case for collection of a note upon which defendant .~.: •. , .. , 
either is or is not liable. :J 
We respectfully submit that these findings, con .. 
elusions and judgments cannot stand. 
RICH AND ELTON, 
Attorneys for .Appellant. 
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